The allocation of students to courses is a wide-spread and repeated task in higher education, often accomplished by a simple first-come first-served (FCFS) procedure.
Introduction
The Nobel Memorial Price in Economic Science in 2012 was awarded to Alvin E. Roth and Lloyd S. Shapley for "the theory of stable allocations and the practice of market design" as the Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences put it. Market design is an academic field at the intersection of computer science, economics, and the management sciences concerned with the design of market institutions (Roth 2002 (Roth , pp. 1341 (Roth -1378 Milgrom 2011, pp. 311-320) , with many recent contributions from the Information Systems community (for example Weinhardt et al. (2003, pp. 635-640) , Bapna et al. (2004, pp. 21-43) , Bichler et al. (2009, pp. 111-117) and Bichler et al. (2011, pp. 688-699) ).
Roth and Shapley were recognized for their work on stable matching between two sets of elements given preferences of each element over the other set. Those sets could be students and courses for example, and in contrast to auction markets no monetary transfers are allowed. A matching is stable, if there does not exist any alternative pairing in which both students and course organizers are better off. The problem of computing a stable matching is different from that of computing a maximum weight bipartite matching in the assignment problem, which is regularly taught in computer and management science. Gale and Shapley (1962, pp. 9-15) presented one of the most commonly used two-sided matching models, the marriage model, which matches a single man to a single woman (one-to-one). They suggested the Gale-Shapley deferred acceptance algorithm to find a stable matching.
Gale and Shapley (1962, pp. 9-15) show that, when preferences are strict, the deferred acceptance algorithm yields the unique stable matching in O(n²) time that is Pareto superior to any other stable matching from the viewpoint of the students. Therefore, the outcome of the student proposing deferred acceptance algorithm is also called the student optimal stable matching and the mechanism that associates the student optimal stable matching to any one-to-many matching problem as it can be found in school choice or college admission is known as the student optimal stable mechanism (SOSM). The underlying concept is the same as in the one-to-one Gale-Shapley deferred acceptance algorithm. Besides the fact that it gives the most efficient stable matching, another appealing feature of the SOSM is that it is strategy-proof (Roth 1982, pp. 617-628) . Strategy-proofness means that no student has an incentive to misreport his true preferences and students have dominant strategies, clearly a very desirable property.
Although SOSM is strategy-proof and stable, the matching is not necessarily Pareto efficient, which is another important design desideratum. Only recently, Kesten (2010 Kesten ( , pp. 1297 Kesten ( -1348 proposed the adjusted deferred acceptance mechanism (EADAM) that allows for stability and Pareto efficiency at the expense of strategy-proofness. However, truth telling of students is a Bayesian Nash equilibrium in this mechanism. Even if there are no dominant strategies, possibilities to strategically misrepresent preferences are minimal in most applications. EADAM can be seen as a significant contribution to the literature. Apart from EADAM there have been a number of recent contributions with respect to the assignment of bundles of courses to a single student, and the theory of matching has drawn quite a bit of recent academic attention with many open problems which can be considered fundamental for Economics and the Management Sciences in general.
In this paper, we will focus on the one-to-many matching problem in the context of course allocation, as it is a wide-spread problem in higher education and beyond. We will discuss prime candidates for the solution of this problem and complement this survey with results from a field study, in which we compare two stable matching mechanisms to a first-comefirst-served (FCFS) mechanism, a standard mechanism in many institutions. Given the widespread application of FCFS, it is interesting to understand the impact of stable matching mechanisms over FCFS in terms of stability and efficiency. Our field studies are the first to analyze EADAM in a real-world application to our knowledge, and we are not aware of empirical work comparing stable matching mechanisms such as SOSM or EADAM to FCFS. Apart from strategic properties of mechanisms such as strategy-proofness and stability, these field experiments shed light on secondary desiderata such as the average rank of students or the rank distribution that result from stable matching mechanisms and the incumbent FCFS.
Note that we do not consider time tabling problems or capacity management with respect to rooms available in a school, because such decisions are typically made before students register for one or another course.
In Section 2 we will introduce stable matching and discuss various applications to provide an introduction to the field. In Section 3, we formally introduce the course allocation problem and provide relevant design desiderata as well as a succinct description of SOSM, EADAM, and FCFS. Section 4 introduces data and the results of two field experiments. This provides an understanding of how such mechanisms can be evaluated in practice and how the outcomes of FCFS differ from those of stable matching mechanisms. In Section 6 we discuss recent literature on the allocation of course schedules, before we conclude the paper in Section 7.
Stable matching and its applications
We will first give an overview of typical problems and successful applications before we focus on course allocation in more detail. In particular, the school choice problem has drawn a lot of attention and it shares many similarities with course allocation. In order to give parents the opportunity to choose the public school their child will attend, many U.S. states provide school choice systems. Each prospective student submits a list of preferences of schools to the central placement authority of the school district. On the other hand each school has a priority ordering of all students and a maximum capacity. This information is used to determine which student will be assigned to which school. Abdulkadiroğlu and Sönmez (2003, pp. 729-747) showed that matching mechanisms that have been in use in the US did not perform well in terms of efficiency, incentives, and stability. As a consequence, the Boston Public Schools replaced a priority mechanism (the Boston mechanism) with a deferred acceptance mechanism in 2005. Abdulkadiroglu, Pathak et al. (2006) present further arguments against the Boston mechanism. This mechanism does not exhibit a dominant strategy equilibrium and it is not stable. Some experimental work has focused on school choice comparing these two approaches. For example, in Chen and Sönmez (2006, pp. 202-231) experimental subjects play a one-shot game of incomplete information in which each participant is only informed about his own preferences, schools' capacities, and the matching mechanism. They find that from the perspective of students, the SOSM outperforms both the Boston mechanism and other alternatives. Featherstone and Niederle (2008) confirm this, but also discuss settings with only private information of subjects, where the Boston mechanism has advantages.
In Germany, the assignment of students to universities via the Zentralstelle für die Vergabe von Studienplätzen (ZVS) is a large-scale application of matching. One part of the capacity is reserved for excellent students and students with long waiting times via a Boston mechanism. The remaining places are allocated on the basis of universities' preferences via a university-proposing Gale-Shapley deferred acceptance mechanism. The two parts are administered sequentially in the aforementioned order (Westkamp 2012, pp. 561-589) . Braun, Dwenger et al. (2007) present evidence from the field that some applicants behave strategically and not truthfully in this combined mechanism. Another widely cited application of oneto-many stable matching is the assignment of graduating medical students to their first hospital appointments by the National Resident Match Program in the US (Roth 1984 (Roth , pp. 991-1016 . A number of other applications can be found online (http://www.matching-inpractice.eu/).
The Gale-Shapley deferred acceptance mechanism has dominated the stable matching literature for many years and most comparisons are with the Boston mechanism, probably driven by the school choice problem. The outcomes of both mechanisms are not necessarily Pareto efficient, however. Unfortunately, Kesten (2010 Kesten ( , pp. 1297 Kesten ( -1348 shows that there cannot exist a mechanism always returns a Pareto optimal and stable matching.
There are Pareto efficient and strategy-proof (but not stable) mechanisms for school choice proposed by Abdulkadiroğlu and Sönmez (2003, pp. 729-747) , which are based on the top trading cycle algorithm (Shapley and Scarf 1974, pp. 23-37) . This mechanism enables a student to obtain a higher priority at a desirable school by trading his priority for a less desirable school with another student. In the context of school choice problems, the idea of trading priorities has been perceived as a problem. Alternatively, a simple random serial dictatorship can be used, where students are randomly ordered and then assigned to their first preference among the remaining schools. Also this mechanism is efficient and strategy-proof, but not stable. Similar to the top trading cycle, it has not been used for school choice or college admission as far as we know. Roth (2002 Roth ( , pp. 1341 Roth ( -1378 argues based on empirical observations that stability is a key feature of successful matching mechanisms in practice.
Gale and Shapley (1962, pp. 9-15) showed that the deferred acceptance algorithm leads to stable matchings if preferences are strict and complete. In practice, preference lists might be incomplete and the schools that are not on the preference list of a student might just not be acceptable to a student. Such problems can be accommodated by a version of SOSM (Manlove et al. 2002, pp. 261-279) . It might also be that there are ties in the preferences or that unlisted schools have the lowest preference for students and they are tied but acceptable. A common practice in case of ties is to randomly break the ties. Erdil and Ergin (2008, pp. 669-689) show that there can be efficiency losses by SOSM when ties in priorities are broken in some random way. They introduce one mechanism that restores such artificial welfare losses. EADAM is an alternative way to recover welfare losses originating from random tie-breaking, which is another appealing feature of the mechanism and a reason, why we discuss it in this paper.
Note that there are also related versions of the stable matching problem that are computationally hard. For example, if there are ties, the preferences are incomplete, and the schools which are not listed are unacceptable, then finding a maximum cardinality stable matching is an NP-complete problem (Manlove et al. 2002, pp. 261-279) . Related work has looked into approximation algorithms for hard stable matching problems (Halldórsson et al. 2003, pp. 431-447 ). We will not discuss questions of computational complexity further in this paper. In our field studies below we assume the preferences of students to be strict and courses not ranked by the students are considered unacceptable. We also refer the interested reader to Manlove (2013) for a comprehensive study of algorithmic aspects of matching problems.
Although the course allocation problem is similar to school choice it has not received as much attention in the literature, and different mechanisms are being used in practice. We are not aware of applications of the Boston mechanism, random serial dictatorship, or the toptrading cycle for course allocation, for example. Typically, monetary transfers are not allowed for course assignment in higher education so that auctions are not an option. However, some business schools in the USA use course bidding, where students are given a bid endowment in a virtual currency to allocate across the courses they consider taking. This virtual currency does not have outside value and there are various possibilities for manipulation (see Sönmez and Ünver (2010, pp. 99-123) and Krishna and Ünver (2008, pp. 262-282) ). Krishna and Unver (2005) report on a field experiment with 535 students comparing course bidding with the Gale-Shapley stable matching mechanism and find that the latter could vastly improve efficiency.
Course allocation problem
Similar to school choice one can argue that stability is a desirable feature of course allocation mechanisms (Roth 2002 (Roth , pp. 1341 (Roth -1378 . We want to discuss the relative merits of stable matching mechanisms for course allocation in this paper and compare them to FCFS. For this we will define the course allocation problem more formally in the next section and discuss prime candidates for stable course allocation mechanisms, as well as the FCFS procedure.
Matchings, matching mechanisms, and their properties
A course allocation problem consists of a finite set of students and a finite set of courses with the maximum capacities ( ). To ensure that a feasible matching exists we assume for all and ∑ . Each student has a preference relation over the courses C (called student preferences), each course (organizer) a preference relation over the students S (called course organizer preferences). These are essentially priority orderings of the course organizer over the students, which means that the course organizers will not be considered as strategic. We will assume strict preferences although SOSM and EADA extend easily for the case of indifferences. Kesten (2010 Kesten ( , pp. 1297 Kesten ( -1348 should illustrate these definitions.
Example 1. Consider the course allocation problem with four students and four courses , each course having one seat. The course organizer preferences ( ) and the student preferences ( ) are given below:
Tab. 1 Course organizer preferences ( ) and student preferences ( ) for Example 1. Underlined preferences describe a matching.
One desirable property of matchings is Pareto efficiency such that no student can be made better off without making any other student worse off.
Definition 2 (Pareto efficiency of matchings). A matching is Pareto efficient with respect to the students if there is no other feasible matching such that ( ) ( ) for all students
and ( ) ( ) for some .
Stability means, that there should be no unmatched pair of a student and a course ( ) where student prefers course to her current assignment and she has higher priority than some other student who is assigned to course . Stability can be seen as capturing no justified envy. ) for all .
Definition 3 (Stability). A matching is stable if ( ) ( ) implies
Next we will discuss mechanisms to compute matchings and their properties. A mechanism returns a matching for given preferences of students and courses. More formally, let denote the set of all feasible matchings. A matching mechanism can be described as a func-
that returns a feasible matching of students to courses for every preference profile of the students. For a submitted preference profile | | of the students, ( ) is the associated matching. For a student the assigned course is ( ) . For a course the set of the assigned students is ( ) .
A mechanism is Pareto efficient if it always selects a Pareto-efficient matching. Also, a mechanism is stable if it always selects a stable matching. Another important property of a mechanism is strategy-proofness. This means, that there is no incentive for any student not to submit her truthful preferences, no matter what the other students submit.
Definition 4 (Strategy-proofness).
A mechanism is strategy-proof if for any | | with and we have ( ) (
( ) describes the preference profile, where the preferences of student s, , differ from his true preferences . Unfortunately, there exists no strategy-proof matching mechanisms that is both efficient and stable (Kesten 2010 (Kesten , pp. 1297 (Kesten -1348 .
For an illustration of the above definitions, we will introduce the random serial dictatorship mechanism, which is arguably one of the simplest matching mechanisms.
Algorithm 1.
Draw uniformly at random a permutation of . of the students in . For from to | | assign student ( ) to her top choice among the remaining slots.
Consider the permutation ( )
which could be the result of a lottery. This would lead to the following ordering of the students ( ). Then the mechanism would work as described in Table 2 .
Tab. 2 Example of the serial dictatorship mechanism
Step Student to be assigned
The matching ( ) would be the result. This result is underlined in Table 1 .
The random serial dictatorship mechanism is Pareto efficient and strategy-proof, which is straightforward to see. Unfortunately, the mechanism is not stable, as the following shows.
Student and course are unmatched, where student prefers course to her current assignment ( ) and she has higher priority to than student who is assigned to course
. By setting and we get ( )
contradicting the definition of stability. Another disadvantage of random serial dictatorship is that course-specific priorities are not possible because there is only one single ordering of the students for all courses.
In the following subsections, we describe stable matching mechanisms to solve the course allocation problem. SOSM is well known, while the EADAM is a more recent approach, which gives up on strategy-proofness for a weaker game-theoretical solution concept, that of a Bayes-Nash equilibrium, to gain efficiency. Then we will briefly introduce FCFS as it used in many universities.
Gale-Shapley student-optimal stable mechanism (SOSM)
The Gale-Shapley student-optimal stable mechanism (SOSM) is a modified version of the Gale-Shapley deferred acceptance algorithm from (Gale and Shapley 1962, pp. 9-15) , which allows for one-to-many assignments. This algorithm works as follows:
Algorithm 2.
Step 1: Each student proposes to her first choice course. For each course with a capacity , those proposers who have the highest priority for are tentatively assigned to , the remaining proposers are rejected.
In general, at
Step , : Each student who was rejected in the previous step ( ) proposes to her next choice course. For each course , from the new proposers and those who were tentatively assigned at a previous step, the with the highest priority are tentatively assigned to , the rest is rejected.
The algorithm terminates when no student is rejected any more.
Example 2. Consider the problem given in Example 1:
Tab. 3 Course organizer preferences ( ) and student preferences ( ) for Example 2
The steps of the algorithm applied to this problem are shown in the following table. The students that are tentatively assigned to a course are shown in a box, the rejected students are not shown in a box.
Tab. 4 Example of the Gale-Shapley student-optimal stable mechanism
Step 1 2 3 4 5
The resulting matching is ( ) and is underlined in Table 3 .
As the name suggests, SOSM is stable (see Gale and Shapley (1962, pp. 9-15) for the proof)
and strategy-proof (Abdulkadiroğlu and Sönmez 2003, pp. 729-747 ) (Proposition 2)). It is used in the public school systems of Boston and New York City, and both properties were used as an argument to switch to this mechanism.
One can easily verify, however, that the matching is not Pareto efficient. If the students , and would be assigned to their first choice course and would not be changed, then three students would be better off. This means, that SOSM may produce welfare losses on the students side and these losses can be significant. The top trading cycle algorithm is an alternative algorithm, which is strategy-proof and efficient, but not stable (Abdulkadiroğlu and Sönmez 2003) , but in school choice applications stability has typically been preferred over efficiency.
The Boston mechanism is another algorithm that has been used for school choice. It works as follows. Let us assume that there are m schools. For round k=1 to m it does the following.
In each round k, those students who have not been allocated a seat yet are considered to be allocated a seat at their k-th most preferred school. The seats are allocated according to the priorities of the schools as long as capacity is not used up. By the end of round m, each student has been allocated a school seat. The Boston mechanism is manipulable and truthful revelation is not a dominant strategy (Abdulkadiroğlu and Sönmez 2003, pp.729-747) . Multiple sources discuss strategies that yield better outcomes than truth-telling such as not ranking unachievable courses (Abdulkadiroğlu et al. 2006) . Also the EADAM mechanism intro-duced in the next subsection does not provide strategy-proofness, but truth-telling is a Bayes-Nash equilibrium strategy.
3.3 Efficiency adjusted deferred acceptance mechanism (EADAM) Kesten (2010 Kesten ( , pp. 1297 Kesten ( -1348 ) introduced a matching mechanism, which reduces welfare losses on the student side as described above, but gives up on strategy-proofness. If we again look at Example 2, we can see that there is a rejection chain from step to , which is initiated by student at course who rejects in step .
This rejection induces the rejections at the steps , and , where is rejected from course . Student does not benefit from being tentatively assigned to course from step to step and only hurts the other students ( , and The following algorithm describes the above mechanism.
Algorithm 3 (Kesten 2010).
Step : Run the DA algorithm.
Step : Find the last step (of the DA algorithm run in Step )
at which a consenting interrupter is rejected from the course for which he is an interrupter. Identify all interrupting pairs of that step each of which contains a consenting interrupter.
If there are no interrupting pairs, then stop. For each identified interrupting pair ( ), remove course from the preferences of student without changing the relative order of the remaining courses. Re-run the DA algorithm with the new preference profile.
In general,
Step , : Find the last step (of the DA algorithm run in
Step ) at which a consenting interrupter is rejected from the course for which he is an interrupter. Identify all inter- Example 3. Again, we look at the problem given in Example 1, assuming for simplicity that all students consent.
Step 0: See Example 2.
Step 1: Since student is rejected from course at
Step and since student has been rejected from course while student was tentatively assigned to course , we identify ( ) as the last and the only interrupting pair. Suppose student consents. Then we remove course from student 's preferences Tab. 5 Course organizer preferences ( ) and updated student preferences ( ) for Example 3
and re-run the DA algorithm with the new preference profile shown in Table 5 .
Tab. 6 Example of the efficiency adjusted deferred acceptance mechanism
Step 1 The resulting matching is
The outcomes of SOSM (underlined) and EADAM (in boxes) are shown in Table 5 and 6 resp. Kesten (2010 Kesten ( , pp. 1297 Kesten ( -1348 ) also describes a straightforward extension for the matching with indifferences. While EADAM is not strategy-proof, speculation is difficult and truthtelling is a Bayesian Nash equilibrium.
First-come-first-served course allocation system (FCFS)
Other than the two prominent stable matching mechanisms, we introduce a simple firstcome-first-served course allocation system used at many universities. During the application period students can assign to exactly one course wherever free seats are available based on their time of arrival after the registration time starts. Changing the course assignment later is only possible after the existing course assignment is canceled by a student. Sometimes students just cannot be the first to register due to circumstances beyond their control and the outcome might be unstable and inefficient. Also, the registration process for groups of courses is often ordered sequentially, such that students have to decide in one period whether they register for a particular set of courses or wait for a later period with a course of higher priority. Now, students need to speculate on their probability of getting a seat in a more popular course with a later registration time, or they rather register for a less preferred course early.
Field experiments
Apart from the theoretical properties of the matching mechanisms described above it is interesting to understand, which differences in the outcome can be expected in the field. In what follows, we will discuss the data elicitation for field experiments and introduce the metrics, which allow for the comparison of outcomes.
Data collection
We collected preferences from students for two courses in the summer term 2012 and the winter term 2012/13.
The first field experiment was on a lecture with 136 students, who had to be assigned to 8
courses with a capacity of 17 seats. The students provided their preferences in the FCFS system and their ordinal preferences in a second system at about the same time. The comparison was only done with respect to the 136 students who provided their preferences in both systems. The students were told about SOSM and the fact that the mechanism is strat-egy-proof, and we would decide randomly on the outcome of one of the systems to finally determine the assignment.
We used the same data to compute efficient matchings in EADAM. While EADAM is not strategy-proof for students, truth-telling is an ordinal Bayesian Nash equilibrium and we suspect that students would not be able to game the mechanism strategically in such an environment. So, when we compute the EADAM outcomes, we assume that the students would also provide their preferences truthfully and consent to waive a certain priority since a consenting student causes himself no harm in EADAM. Figure 1 shows the histogram of the number of preferences the students submitted. For instance 26 students submitted 3 preferences for the courses. We can also see that 63 students submitted preferences over all 8 courses.
The second field experiment in the summer term 2012 was on a large class with 794 students overall, and the students provided their preferences for 45 lab courses taking place at different times of the week. After the students registered in the first weeks of the semester in the FCFS system, we asked them to provide their preferences in an ordinal ranking within the subsequent 3 weeks. The sizes of the courses range from 14 to 22 students restricted by the room size. The 45 courses would have a capacity of 858 course seats.
The lecture was very large and for organizational reasons, we could not elicit all preferences as in the first field experiment. Overall, 418 of the 794 students provided their ordinal preferences, and only those students who provided their preferences and who were matched in the FCFS system were considered in a comparison. As a consequence, the group size of the courses was reduced proportionally by to allow for a comparison of the two approaches.
As indicated in the last section, in the FCFS system the students can often only register for groups of courses one after the other. This is done with large classes to avoid overload of the system. The registration process in this study began at 4 different points in time. The courses were classified by the weekday they were held. The time difference between these 4 points was 2 hours each. This can lead to speculation where students register for a group at an earlier time to prevent not getting a seat in any group. The histogram of the number of preferences the students submitted in the second field experiment is shown in Figure 2 . 10 students submitted preferences over all 45 courses. The 45 courses for this large class were distributed over 18 time slots with up to 5 courses. Although, we could not elicit all student preferences for this experiment for organizational reasons, we believe that the data provides another valuable observation and an estimate on how well stable matching performs as compared to an FCFS approach for large course allocation problems.
Generation of course organizers preferences
In both real applications course organizers did not use preferences on the assignment of students to different courses. We also wanted to get an understanding of the differences between SOSM and EADAM in case course organizers have preferences. In our department such preferences typically concern the type of study, the grades of a student, and taken precourses. In order to compare the matching mechanisms with preferences of course organizers we generated preferences of course organizers with indifferences across groups of students in four different ways, which are natural in our application domain.
First, we know the type of study (Computer Science (CS), Information Systems (IS), Mathematics, and Business) of all students participating in the experiments. In order to introduce realistic correlation among the student and the course organizer preferences we first looked at the top five student preferences for the different types of study. Depending on that we generated the type of study preferences for the courses. For example the course organizer of a course that is very popular among IS students would prefer IS students with a higher likelihood.
A second possibility for generating course organizers preferences are pre-courses being desired prerequisites for certain courses. We assumed five pre-courses that we determined for all of the courses according to the actual prerequisites. Based on real distributions on the taken pre-courses for the different types of study at our department we assigned the precourses to the students depending on their type of study. For instance a CS student has a higher probability to have taken a CS pre-course than a Business student. On the course organizers' side we randomly assigned the pre-courses according to the distribution of types of study in a course. As we had more CS students than Math students, more CS pre-course attendees were assigned to the courses. A course organizer prefers those students who have taken pre-courses for his course.
Third, we generated course organizers' preferences by looking at the grades of students. As we do not have the real grades of the students available due to privacy restrictions, we took the real distribution of average grades in our department and assigned grades to the students according to this distribution. Course organizers prefer higher grades across all courses, so their preferences are all the same for this preference.
Finally, we generated combined preferences by first assigning pre-course preferences to a course. Ties were broken by type of study and then by grade. We will report on the mean of 400 runs with different course organizer preferences, 100 for each method described above.
This appears to be a likely type of preferences in our matching applications.
Metrics for matchings
In order to compare matching mechanisms, we will now introduce three metrics that allow for a comparison of the empirical results.
Average rank
Using the information on the ranks the students (courses) achieved is a standard way of gauging the welfare of the students (courses). In particular, the average rank has been used as a metric to gauge the difference in welfare of matching algorithms in Budish and Cantillon (2012 , pp. 2237 -2271 and Abdulkadiroğlu et. al. (2009 Abdulkadiroğlu et. al. ( , pp. 1954 Abdulkadiroğlu et. al. ( -1978 , two of the few experimental papers on matching mechanisms. The following two tables show a comparison of SOSM (Example 2) and EADAM (Example 3) for students (Table 7) and courses ( The average rank for a single course with multiple seats is the average of the ranks of its assigned students. The average overall course rank is the mean of the average ranks per course. 
Popularity
As defined in Abraham et al. (2007 Abraham et al. ( , pp. 1030 Abraham et al. ( -1045 , a matching is more popular than another matching ( ), if the number of students (courses) that prefer to exceeds the number of students (courses) that prefer to . The preference of a course or student is the sign of the difference of the ranks. A comparison of the popularity of SOSM (Example 2) and EADAM (Example 3) for students is shown in Table 9 . A similar popularity metric can be derived for the course organizers.
Tab. 
Rank distribution
The rank distribution compares how many students were assigned to their first choice, how many to their second choice, and so on. Similarly, for courses it compares how many students were assigned to the first choice of a course. 
Results of the first field experiment
With the preferences of the 136 students from the first field experiment and the data about the courses we ran SOSM and EADAM in order to compute a matching of the students and courses. We first provide a comparison, where course organizers do not have preferences, and a second comparison, where we generated preferences of course organizers over students (see Section 3.2). Note that without preferences of group organizers there is no difference between SOSM and EADAM. Students will only be rejected when the group is full. This means that no student will be tentatively placed to a group when other students are rejected from that group and later on also be rejected from that group. If there are no interrupters, the preferences of the students will not be changed and EADAM will stop in step 1, thus returning the same result as SOSM. However, we decided to report both results (SOSM and EADAM) in both subsections for completeness.
No preferences of course organizers
The average rank metric (Table 11) shows that both SOSM and EADAM result in better matchings than the FCFS, even though the differences are small. The shorthand n/p refers to students being assigned to courses they have no preference for. If these courses are unacceptable, these students would not be matched. 
Popularity

FCFS SOSM FCFS EADAM SOSM EADAM
The rank distribution metric ( Note that the first-come-first-served course allocation system assigned 5 students to a group where the students have no preference (n/p) for, SOSM or EADAM would assign 6 students to a group where they have no preference for as they require a stable matching. Typically, it is students who submit only a small number of course preferences, who are assigned a course for which they have provided no preference. Nevertheless, this illustrates that FCFS can lead to mores students being matched to a course for which they have provided a preference, compared to SOSM and EADAM. Other than that, the metrics show that SOSM and EADAM result in better matchings than the first-come-first-served course allocation system when no group preferences exist.
With preferences of course organizers
In order to compare the matching mechanisms with preferences of course organizers we generated random group preferences with indifferences over the 136 students. The following results show the mean of 400 runs with the generated group preferences with indifferences.
As can be expected, FCFS yields unstable results. Unstable means that blocking pairs of unmatched students and schools exist, who would prefer to be matched with each other rather than their current assignment. We have identified 25 blocking pairs (18% of all students) on average.
Students
For the students the average rank metric (Table 14) shows that EADAM would provide the best results. On the same metric, SOSM would result in a better matching than FCFS.
Tab. 14 Student average ranks of FCFS, SOSM and EADAM with generated group preferences FCFS SOSM EADAM Average rank 1.31 (5 n/p) 1.28 (6.88 n/p) 1.26 (6.88 n/p)
In contrast to the average rank metric, the popularity metric (see Tab. 15) shows a different result for the comparison of the FCFS course allocation system and SOSM. In this case FCFS is more popular than SOSM. This discrepancy is due to the fact that the 19.19 students (mean of 400 runs) who were better off with SOSM were matched to a much better ranked group than the 19.33 students being better off with FCFS. Hence the average rank for SOSM is lower than for FCFS. Still, EADAM shows the best results. 
Popularity
FCFS SOSM FCFS EADAM SOSM EADAM
The same result as the average rank metric is found based on the rank distribution metric in Table 16 with EADAM matching the most students to their first preference. n/p 5 (3.7%) 6.9 (5.1%) 6.9 (5.1%)
With preferences of course organizers, EADAM results in the best matching for the students.
Courses
For the courses the average rank metric (Table 17) shows that SOSM produces the best matchings regarding the preferences of course organizers, but SOSM and EADAM would both be preferred to FCFS by course organizers.
Tab. 17 Group average ranks of FCFS, SOSM and EADAM with generated group preferences FCFS SOSM EADAM Average rank 66.90 (0 n/p) 63.33 (0 n/p) 64.44 (0 n/p)
The same observation can also be made with regard to the popularity metric that is shown in 
Popularity
FCFS SOSM FCFS EADAM SOSM EADAM
The reason EADAM is less preferable to the course organizers is that it aims to increase the welfare of the students when it does improvements of the students. Also, the rank distribution metric shows that course organizers would prefer SOSM. Overall, EADAM and SOSM would result in the better outcomes than FCFS for both students and course organizers, with or without preferences of course organizers in this field experiment.
Results of the second field experiment
In the second field experiment, we again analyze situations with or without preferences of group organizers. The second experiment is larger and we wanted to understand if the results from the first experiment carry over.
No preferences of course organizers
The average rank metric (Table 20) shows that with FCFS the students would be assigned to their 2.91th choice on average with 38 students being assigned to a course where they have no preference (n/p) for. However, with SOSM or EADAM the students would be assigned to their 1.78th choice and 53 students to a course they have no preference for. 
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If we look at the rank distribution metric (see Table 22 ) it shows that with SOSM or EADAM 280 students would be assigned to their first choice, whereas only 223 got their first choice with the first-come-first-served course allocation system. The first-come-first-served course allocation system assigned 38 students to a group where the students have no preference (n/p) for, SOSM or EADAM would assign 53 students to a group where they have no preference for. The reason for this could be the fact, that many students submitted very few preferences, as we saw in Figure 2 . The three metrics average rank, popularity and rank distribution all show that without group preferences, SOSM or EADAM would result in a better matching for the students. Again, a disadvantage is the higher number of students matched to a group where they do not have preferences for, which is a consequence of the fact that students often only provided preferences for a few courses.
With preferences of course organizers
In this case FCFS induces 189 blocking pairs (45% of all students) on average, meaning that 189 pairs of student and school could improve their assignment by switching.
Students
The average ranks for students if course organizers have preferences are shown in Table   23 . Using SOSM instead of FCFS the average rank improvement for each student would be 0.73. With EADAM rather than FCFS the average rank improvement would be 0.87. This does not mean that every student would improve by 0.87 ranks. Some might not improve or even worsen, and some would improve by more than one rank. The popularity metric (see Table 24 ) leads to the same result as the average rank metric with EADAM showing the best results for the students. The significant differences between the results of SOSM and EADAM emphasize the welfare losses for students that could be produced by SOSM.
The difference in the results for the students without group preferences (Section 5.1) is due to the fact that the group preferences affect the assignment process. For the case with group preferences a student could be rejected from a course after being tentatively assigned to it.
This could not happen without group preferences.
Courses
The average rank metric (see Table 26 ) for courses shows that both SOSM and EADAM result in better matchings for the courses with SOSM as the better alternative. It is clear that SOSM and EADAM provide better results than the first-come-first-served course allocation system since they are considering the group preferences. The better result of SOSM versus EADAM can again be explained by the fact that EADAM is improving the welfare of the students, thus negatively affecting the course organizers. 
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In Table 28 the rank distribution for courses is provided. For example using SOSM, 15.6 students (3.7%) would be matched to the top 10 ranks of a course. Also in that case, the results show that SOSM would be the best matching mechanism for the courses with EADAM providing better results than the first-come-first-served course allocation system. Overall, EADAM resulted in better outcomes than FCFS for students and courses with or without preferences of course organizers. The experiments provide some useful information.
First, the results suggest that EADAM is the preferred alternative, although the differences are not substantial. Second, there are trade-offs and the stable matching mechanism on average have more students unmatched, which might be an important criterion in some applications.
Towards multiunit and combinatorial assignments
Course assignment has become a popular research topic with many recent developments, as applications are wide-spread. One none-trivial extension that researchers have considered only recently are minimum quotas for courses. This is practically relevant if course organizers want to avoid situations where they have only a few students in their class. It is known that there is no strategy-proof mechanism that completely eliminates justified envy when minimum quotas are imposed (Hamada et al. 2011, pp. 180-191) . Ueda et al. (2012 Ueda et al. ( , pp. 1327 Ueda et al. ( -1328 recently proposed strategy-proof mechanisms, which allows for minimum quotas and achieve efficiency with a weaker notion of stability.
Much of the new developments have been on the assignment of multiple course seats to one student, i.e., the multiunit assignment problem or combinatorial assignment problem, resp. Budish and Cantillon (2012 , pp. 2237 -2271 analyze multiunit assignment problems, where students want to get seats, not only a single out of many possible courses, and their preferences are ordinal and responsive. Responsiveness describes a form of separability of preferences about different courses: If a student prefers one course over the other, , he also prefers a bundle of courses to a bundle of courses . Theoretical analyses show that serial dictatorships are the only strategy-proof and efficient mechanisms for this problem (Pápai 2001, pp. 257-271; Ehlers and Klaus 2003, pp. 265-280) . Unfortunately, they lead to highly unfair outcomes in which some students get all the courses they like most, whereas others only a few. Budish and Cantillon (2012 , pp. 2237 -2271 suggest a mechanism with proxy agents, which tries to get fairness of the distribution and efficiency at the expense of strategy-proofness.
The combinatorial assignment problem can be seen as an extension of the multiunit assignment problem, where a set of course seats is to be allocated amongst a set of agents with preferences over bundles of course seats in different courses. Each student wants to get 0 or 1 seat in a course, but his preferences for particular bundles of courses might be substitutes or complements as opposed to the responsive preferences assumed in the multiunit assignment problem. This is similar to a combinatorial auction in which no monetary transfers are allowed. In recent work by Budish (2011 Budish ( , pp. 1061 Budish ( -1103 suggests a mechanism, which adapts the idea of Competitive Equilibrium from Equal Incomes (Varian 1976, pp. 249-260) to environments with indivisible goods and proofs approximations of efficiency, strategyproofness, and fairness properties. Othman et al. (2010, pp. 873-880) describe computational methods to implement the mechanism.
Another interesting extension of SOSM in the context of the hospitals/residents problem is the consideration of couples. The set of residents also includes couples who must be assigned together, either to the same hospital or to a specific pair of hospitals chosen by the couple. The addition of couples to the hospitals/residents problem renders the problem NPcomplete (Gusfield and Irving 1989) .
Conclusion
We have discussed established and more recent algorithmic developments for course allocation problems. The Gale-Shapley student optimal stable mechanism (SOSM) is a wellestablished matching mechanism which is applied for the assignment of students to public universities in the U.S. and in the school choice problems, for instance. While strategy-proof for students and stable, SOSM may not always be efficient. Kesten's efficiency adjusted deferred acceptance mechanism (EADAM) (Kesten 2010 (Kesten , pp. 1297 (Kesten -1348 eliminates welfare losses on the students' side at the expense of strategy-proofness. It is a bit surprising that these algorithms have found little application in the large number of matching problems in university environments so far and first-come-first-served (FCFS) approaches are still in wide-spread use.
In this paper, we provided a brief survey of this field, which has seen a number of recent advances. In addition, we discuss the results of two field experiments, in which we compare an FCFS mechanism with SOSM and EADAM. The FCFS matching and the matchings of SOSM and EADAM were compared using average rank metrics, popularity, and rank distribution metrics. By and large, the outcomes of stable matching mechanisms were preferable to FCFS in both experiments, however, the differences were not substantial. Actually, the number of unmatched students was lower in FCFS throughout. For practitioners it is worthwhile to understand the different design desiderata and metrics before introducing a new matching mechanism. Still, one of the biggest advantages of SOSM and EADAM beyond the stability of the outcomes might be the fact that there are strong incentives for telling the truth and there are no benefits to being first during the registration period, which might lead to unfair outcomes as some students can just not be first due to circumstances beyond their control.
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